The pro-democracy, anti-Musharraf movement launched by the combined opposition in May 2006 will once again put on trial the strength and determination of the people of Pakistan to snatch power from the clutches of the military. The Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD), a conglomerate of 15 parties, has demanded the resignation of President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz by July 31, 2006, failing which a vote of no-confidence would be moved against the Musharraf regime. The demand was made in a resolution adopted by the Alliance on July 2. Earlier, on May 25, the ARD components endorsed the Charter of Democracy issued by the two former prime ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in London on May 14, 2006.
The ARD resolution threatened that the opposition parties would fight for "undiluted democracy", "a vibrant opposition", "a cooperative federation" and "maximum provincial autonomy in the ambit of the 1973 Constitution". How far the opposition succeeds in these objectives will hinge on whether its components will forget past differences and work together. The Charter, after all, was the culmination of efforts over more than a year, starting with Benazir Bhutto's Jeddah meeting with Nawaz Sharif in February 2005.
While there is an apparent unanimity of goals among the mainstream opposition parties, there are solid contradictions among them as well. These contradictions emanate from the differing ideologies, deep mutual mistrust and competing party interests. Differences between the PPP (People's Party Parliamentarians) and the PML(N) (Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz) have already surfaced on the basis that while the PML(N) would not mind co-operation with the MMA (Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal), the PPP leadership is quite allergic to the idea of working with the religious parties. At the same time, doubts persist as to whether Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif can resist any overtures made to them by General Musharraf, which could lure them into unseemly compromises. There are already allegations made by the PML(Q) that Benazir Bhutto had been in touch with Musharraf. Some ARD constituents like the ANP (Awami National Party) have also expressed disillusionment with the Charter. ANP President Asfandyar Wali Khan pointed out that the Charter did not "guarantee" provincial autonomy.
These contradictions are compounded by the posture adopted by the leadership of MQM (Muttahida Qaumi Movement), a coalition partner with the PML(Q) at the centre. On the one hand, the MQM leadership has said that it gives no assurances about supporting President Musharraf's re-election, but on the other the MQM chief Altaf Hussain has rejected the Charter of Democracy. While the Pakistan Oppressed Nations' Movement (PONM) has agreed to join the ARD and the MMA in a joint movement against military rule, its President Mahmood Khan Achakzai has acknowledged that PONM has differences on political issues with the PPP and the PML(N).
MMA's support for the anti-government campaign can be traced to its woes with respect to the functioning of the military regime. MMA's disregard for the military regime started soon after General Musharraf refused to demit the office of the Chief of Army Staff by December 31, 2004 in violation of his agreement with it on the 17th Amendment. The anger with respect to the situation in Balochistan, military operations in Waziristan, and increasing anti-US sentiment have aggravated relations between the two. However, its differences with the ARD as well as its own internal contradictions will determine whether the MMA will be a viable factor in the campaign against Musharraf. While MMA President Qazi Hussain Ahmad stated that the party fully supported all the contents of the Charter of Democracy, its Secretary-General Maulana Fazlur Rehman has admitted to having reservations on a number of aspects of the Charter. Qazi Hussain stated that the option of resigning from the assemblies could be exercised and proposed an election boycott by his party. Maulana Fazlur Rehman, on the other hand, said that the alliance did not want to boycott elections. Both have stressed the importance of a joint campaign to dislocate the military government, though the modalities of the proposed movement have still not been agreed upon. While there is no doubt that the MMA can be counted upon to galvanise enough street power to pressurize the Musharraf government, it remains to be seen whether it would be comfortable in ceding ground to the mainstream parties, which would directly diminish its own political space.
The success of a no-confidence motion against President Musharraf would depend on a two-thirds majority in a joint session of both houses of Parliament. At the same time, while certain legal cases against both Benazir and Nawaz keep them away from the country, there is no certainty whether they would be willing to return, court arrest and inspire mass agitations in the manner the leaders in Nepal did.
While President Musharraf's displeasure with the Charter was made known in his statement that it was an attempt on the part of the two leaders to "save their own future and re-enter power corridors," the standoff between him and the opposition parties is nowhere near convergence. To all intents and purposes, it seems that the movement for democracy at this moment is weak, has not picked up momentum, and will give enough leeway to President Musharraf to manipulate the system and stay in power.
The management of India's international border along its North Eastern States has remained a crucial and complex issue. In an age of increasing interdependence, threats from unconventional sources pose a greater challenge to the country's security. An unmanaged border accentuates such threats by providing easy points of ingress and egress. Travel along India's borders with Bangladesh, Myanmar and Bhutan highlights the porous nature of these borders, which pass through difficult terrain of forest, rivers and mountains and make the task of guarding all the more challenging. The need for guarding these boundaries, especially the 4,096 kilometre long Indo-Bangladesh border, was felt in the mid 1980s. Fencing of the Bangladesh border was then commissioned as a potential mechanism of defending the peace and tranquillity of the North Eastern states.
The presence of militant outfits in most of the North Eastern States and their ability to indulge in hit and run operations across borders has only added to the complexities, both in inter-state and intra-state relations. Most states in the North East have witnessed growing incidence of substance abuse. Drugs, with their origin in Southeast Asian countries, invariably find their way into the region from Myanmar, through states like Mizoram and Manipur. Apart from the unhindered migration severely impacting the demography of the North East, militant outfits operating in the region have been the prime beneficiaries of the porous and unguarded borders.
Beginning with the Naga National Council (NNC) and the Mizo National Front (MNF) whose cadres travelled to neighbouring Myanmar and China for arms as well as to find refuge from Indian military operations, most of these outfits have used the porosity of the borders to move in men and weapons stealthily. The successor to the NNC, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), which subsequently split into two factions led by Isak-Muiva and Khaplang, has had a number of camps in the Sagaing division of Myanmar since the mid-1980s. Similarly, more than 10 outfits operating in states such as Assam, Manipur, Tripura and Meghalaya have set up camps in Bhutan and Bangladesh.
The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), which operates in Assam, enjoyed facilities in Bhutan till "Operation All Clear" by the Royal Bhutanese Army in December 2003 flushed its cadres out. During its sojourn in Bhutan, ULFA, along with the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), carried out hit and run attacks in various districts of Assam. Though there have been recent reports of the ULFA trying to re-establish its camps in Bhutan, India's borders with that country, spanning over 699 kilometres, are more or less secure today.
Growing cooperation with Myanmar has led to the periodic launching of military operations by the Myanmarese army against Indian rebels. In fact, narratives on the region such as Bertil Lintner's 'Land of Jade' provide details of the army operations targeting the NSCN in the 1980s, which temporarily dislocated the militants from that region. Such operations have continued till recent times. However, due to the non-permanent presence of the Myanmarese army in that region, the reason primarily being the hostile terrain, ousting the Indian militants remains a challenge. Similarly, ethnic rebels from Myanmar have found bases within states like Mizoram. Thus, the 1,643 kilometre long Indo-Myanmar border remains a challenge.
Bangladesh too remains an unresolved conundrum. Despite official denial, that country is known to be sympathetic to Indian militants. According to the list provided by the Border Security Force (BSF) in February 2006 to the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) authorities, 172 camps of North Eastern militant outfits are located in Bangladesh. This provides the militant outfits with an opportunity not only to mingle with the agents of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), but also hobnob with Islamist outfits in that country. Such nexus has extended itself to smuggling, trade in small arms and other nefarious cross border activities.
The Indian Government has a Department of Border Management in the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to pay focused attention to issues relating to border management. For the department, in addition to the 3,323 kilometre-long Indo-Pakistan border, fencing of the Indo-Bangladesh border has been accorded top priority in view of infiltration, smuggling and other anti-India activities from across the border. In 1999, in the aftermath of the Kargil Conflict, a comprehensive report on border management was prepared by the Government of India, which stressed on the need for development and growth of forces guarding the border. The need to involve local governments in the overall effort was also suggested by the report.
Fencing the border with Bangladesh has progressed at a slow pace. Under Phase-I, which commenced in 1986, 854 kilometres of fencing was erected. As on March 31, 2006, another 1,448 kilometres has been completed under Phase-II. According to the MHA, the 854 kilometre fence built in Phase-I has, however, already been damaged along most of the stretches and has consequently ceased to be effective in controlling illegal cross border activities. The Ministry plans to start replacing the damaged fencing during 2006-07.
Fencing along India's western borders has been relatively effective, curbing the movement of militants and activities of smugglers and subversives. Even in the North East, fencing, wherever it exists, has been able to contain the movement of militants and contraband. Smuggling in Tripura has been contained to a large extent as a result of the continuing fencing process. The state, which not very long ago was the theatre of an extremely violent militancy, recorded only 28 civilian and 11 security force deaths in 115 militancy related incidents in 2005.
However, the quality of fencing in the North East has remained a problem. Discussions with surrendered militants in these states have revealed that breaching the fencing or simply crossing over it is a relatively simple affair. The fact that there has been no proposal to introduce flood light system like along the Western borders makes the militants' task even less cumbersome. Neither has there been any proposal to settle friendly population along the fencing as a second line of defence.
Friendly relations with neighbouring countries, as far as sound border management is concerned, remain vital. Clearly, the nation needs to be more vigilant and put in a lot more resources, when such a scenario does not exist. Since India's international borders in the North East present an interesting mix of both friendly and unfriendly neighbours, a far greater effort needs to be put into the entire strategy of border management. While India's North East stands to gain from a cooperative framework in the region, important issues of security and development can only be addressed through effective border management.
The July 11 bombing in Mumbai, which left 200 dead and 700 injured, is the deadliest terrorist attack in India this year. It was a systematic and well planned attack engineered between 6.24 pm and 6.35 pm on the Western Railway line during peak-hour when office-goers were returning home.
The last few months had shown enough signs that Maharashtra was likely to experience a terrorist attack. Terrorist plans to target the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) Headquarters on June 1 in Nagpur and the biggest ever seizure of explosives and arms (30 kg of RDX, 10 AK-47 rifles, 2,000 bullets and 40 magazines) from Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives in Aurangabad on May 9 gave adequate warnings that something big might happen. In addition, cases of arms and RDX (two boxes containing RDX and an AK-47 rifle) were seized from Ankai fort of Manmad area of Nashik district on May 13. And subsequently, on May 14, the Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) seized five boxes containing 13 kgs of RDX, five AK-47 rifles, 1,000 live cartridges, 20 magazines and 50 hand grenades from an electronic shop at Azad Nagar in Malegaon. It is believed that these weapons and explosives were meant for distribution in Mumbai and other parts of Maharashtra to be used in carrying out various acts of terrorism.
Mumbai has so far witnessed several terrorist attacks since 1993. A series of bomb blasts ripped through 13 different places in the city on March 12, 1993, killing 257 people and injuring 713. These were the first blasts in which RDX was used and the explosions are understood to have been carried out by Dawood Ibrahim. After nearly a decade, on December 2, 2002, two persons were killed and 31 injured when a powerful bomb exploded in a municipal bus outside Ghatkopar suburban railway station. A few days later, 25 people were injured when a bomb, planted in an air-conditioning duct, exploded in a food plaza at Bombay Central railway station. In 2003, terrorists triggered three bomb blasts in Mumbai. The first was at a shopping complex outside Vile Parle railway station on January 27, 2003, in which 33 people were injured when a crude bomb planted in a bicycle exploded. The second attack occurred on March 13, in which 11 people were killed and 65 injured, in a 'ladies special' train when it was entering Mulund railway station during peak hours. The third was on August 25, when two successive blasts occurred at the Gateway of India and Zaveri Bazaar, killing 46 people and injuring more than 160. RDX was planted in taxis parked at both these places.
The security and intelligence community are still clueless and have failed to identify the miscreants responsible for last Tuesday's terror. Three days after the attacks, the media reported that a man claiming to represent Al Qaeda, and identifying himself as Abu al-Hadeed, stated that "whoever has carried out the attacks in Bombay, we express our gratitude and happiness". But it is not as yet clear whether Al Qaeda was indeed responsible for the attack. The next day saw another claim being made via email by a new group with links to the LeT called Lashkar-e-Qahar, which claimed that the attack was in retaliation to the situation in Kashmir and the Gujarat communal riots of 2002.
The Maharashtra state police, Railway Police and Mumbai's Anti-Terrorist Squad are handling the investigations. So far no authentic group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, but suspicions and speculation have centred on the LeT and the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). SIMI, a banned organisation since 2001, has a strong network across India and is a principal ally of almost all major Islamist terrorist groups. In fact, it played a key role in several major terror strikes like the July 28, 2005 bombing of the Shramjeevi Express at Jaunpur, and the Varanasi serial bombings of March 7, 2006. In addition, several of the 11 LeT operatives arrested from the Aurangabad area in May 2006, while attempting to move a shipment of explosives, assault rifles, and grenades into Gujarat, had worked for SIMI before it was proscribed.
LeT, an Islamist militant group, formed in 1990 in Afghanistan, and banned by India, Pakistan and the United States, is one of the most active groups waging jihad against India. It has denied involvement in the latest Mumbai attacks and its spokesman Abdullah Ghaznavi has condemned it as an inhumane and barbaric act. Ghaznavi also said that Islam does not permit the killing of innocent persons and that his outfit does not believe in killing innocent civilians. He further added that blaming the LeT for such an inhumane act is an attempt by the Indian security agencies to defame the freedom struggle in Jammu and Kashmir. However, the fact remains that the outfit has in the past justified many of its violent terrorist attacks as part of its political struggle.
Whether it is the LeT or some other group that has carried out the latest Mumbai massacre, the fact remains that a new trend in terrorist activities in India has emerged. This pertains to groups either denying their involvement or alternately creating fake outfits to hide their real identity. For example, the very next day after the October 29, 2005 terrorist attacks in Delhi, a hitherto unknown outfit, Inquilabi (Revolutionary) Group, claimed responsibility and said that more such attacks would occur in future unless India stopped its "oppressive and hideous measures" in J&K. But when Delhi Police arrested the actual attackers, it turned out that they were LeT members. This pattern was repeated again in early January 2006, when the Jaish-e-Mohammad attempted to throw sleuths off its trail by arranging for a fictitious group, Lashkar-e-Qaharby, to claim responsibility for the January 7 terrorist attack in Varanasi. Delhi Police and intelligence agencies subsequently disproved this claim by tracing calls made by Jaish members.
Another pattern that is becoming evident now is the help being offered by locals to terrorists operating in metropolises. Last Tuesday's bombings in Mumbai might also involve Maharashtra-based SIMI activists. Indian intelligence agencies believe that the LeT has drawn many of its operatives from the large pool of SIMI activists who were radicalised by anti-Muslim riots in Bombay in the 1990s and in Gujarat in 2002. For instance, two months after the Delhi serial blasts on October 29, 2005, Delhi police arrested two terrorists named Saidul and Sohed in the capital who were in regular touch with Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). They were being sheltered by a Bangladeshi national, Mohammad Saidul, who is a scrap dealer based near Ghaddewali masjid in Usmanpur. Similarly, after the Jama Masjid blasts on July 14, 2006, Delhi Police Commissioner said that there was 'strong local support' in the Walled City for the suspects.
Most of the attacks in Indian metropolises, like the terrorist attack on the IISc campus in Bangalore on December 28, 2005, have been carried out by the LeT. Recently, on February 1, 2006, a LeT module was busted in Kolkata. It was planning a possible strike in the city. An analysis of the available facts leads one to the conclusion that the LeT has a wide network in Indian metropolises and big cities, including in Maharashtra. And it is highly likely that one of its terror modules perpetrated the Mumbai massacre on July 11.
Condoleeza Rice's visit to Pakistan on June 27-28, 2006 before she proceeded to Kabul indicated abundant concern on the part of the US government about the increasing strength of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the expectation that Pakistan would pull its weight to ensure better results in combating terrorism. This was made apparent in her clearly enunciated statement which emphasised the need for increased cooperation between Pakistan and the Afghan government on the one hand, and among the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan on the other. American unease at the unfolding situation in Afghanistan was evident from the fact that it was considered necessary by the US Secretary of State to make a stopover in Pakistan, less than four months after she was in that country with President Bush for wide-ranging discussions. This visit should be seen in the backdrop of surging violence in Afghanistan much of which is directed at US-led Western forces and is an indicator of the increased strength of the Taliban as well as increasing anti-American sentiment within the country. Questions are being raised about the efficacy of President Karzai's leadership in ensuring the success of reconstruction efforts as his government is plagued by problems related to corruption, a flourishing drug trade, an inadequate army and a weak police force. At the same time, continuing recriminations directed at Pakistan by the Afghan political leadership for providing shelter, military training and logistics to the Taliban and counter charges by Pakistani officials accusing Afghanistan of supporting and sponsoring the insurgency in Balochistan, provided enough reasons for the Rice visit.
In recent months, the US-led coalition forces have been facing what is perhaps an offensive unmatched in scale since 2001, from the Taliban and assorted rebel groups. The coalition troops have suffered a number of casualties as the Taliban have increasingly relied on suicide bombings and Improvised Explosive Devices to cause damage. The rebel groups, which are considered to be better organized and well equipped, have control over districts in Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul and Helmand provinces. Pakistani media reports allude to the fact that Mullah Dadullah, operating in southern Afghanistan, boasts of commanding a force of 12,000 men with arms. The Taliban are reportedly receiving funds from Islamic groups in Pakistan and private Saudi sources, while weapons seized from Afghan and coalition forces add to their cache. The US Commander in Afghanistan Lt. Gen. Eikenberry, in a recent testimony to US lawmakers, drew attention to the increasing levels of sophistication of the Taliban forces, their growing strength in southern Afghanistan, their display of a better military command and the fact that its leaders had evaded capture. He alluded to the fact that Taliban forces fighting US troops in Afghanistan are directing their operations from Pakistan. It is in the face of the Taliban's expanded fighting capability that a large scale military offensive involving more than 10,000 Afghan and coalition forces called "Operation Mountain Thrust" has been underway in the four provinces mentioned earlier since June 2006. Along with the Afghan and US forces, British, Dutch and Canadian forces are deployed in the southern provinces of Afghanistan. NATO is slated to take over military operations from the US-led coalition in southern Afghanistan from the end of this month. However, it remains to be seen how well NATO troops are able to meet the challenges posed by the escalation of violence by the Taliban as they are supposed to be involved in efforts towards re-construction rather than combat.
Pakistan's alleged involvement in supporting the Taliban and other rebel groups fomenting trouble has caused ire in Afghanistan as is evident in statements made by Karzai and his Foreign Minister directly accusing Pakistan in May 2006. US officials have intermittently accused the Pakistan government of not doing enough with respect to combating terrorism in Afghanistan. While the Pakistan government has continuously denied such allegations, there is enough evidence of continued Pakistani complicity with the Taliban. The presence of safe havens for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda leadership in the border areas of NWFP and Balochistan is well documented. Reports in the Pakistani media as far back as April 2003 alluded to the presence of mobile training camps set up by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda activists, and those loyal to Hekmatyar in these areas, which give training to the local populace. They apparently moved through various villages providing basic training in arms, maps of US bases as well as ways of attacking them. Cities like Quetta and Chaman are thriving with hordes of Taliban and their political and military infrastructure. Maulana Fazlur Rehman, Secretary General of the MMA and the leader of opposition in the National Assembly, said at a Press Conference on 7 August 2005, that the military regime in Islamabad was training the extremists in Mansehra camp and allowing them to infiltrate into Afghanistan. Hundreds of madrassas continue to be a breeding ground for extremist ideologies and practices. Recent Pakistani media reports suggest that the "Al Jamia Islamia," one of the largest madrassas in Chaman, continues to provide recruitment for rebels wanting to fight in Afghanistan. The enduring links of such rebel groups with Islamic parties in Pakistan is highlighted by the fact that the cleric Maulana Abdul Ghani who heads the "Al Jamia Islamia" is a senior leader of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam.
Pakistan has been combating militant organisations along its Afghan border, especially in North and South Waziristan, but with little to show in terms of results. The troop deployment in these areas has increased by 10,000 raising the total number to approximately 90,000. This was announced by Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri in a joint press conference with Condoleeza Rice during her visit, in an attempt to mitigate the impression that Pakistan was not doing enough to combat terrorism. It remains to be seen whether the increase in troop levels will translate into effective action against militants. A serious difference of opinion seems to have arisen between the US and Pakistan over policies towards Afghanistan, and despite their strategic alliance and the US endorsem*nt of Pakistan's role in the war against terrorism, there is a strong likelihood that their approach could come into conflict in the future.
With its economy in a resurgent mode, Russia seems set to regain its traditional influence and power. But in tune with the popular Russian saying that "the bear is still licking its wounds," Russia has to overcome a number of obstacles to sustain its economic growth. Russia's economic resurgence has been made possible by a combination of factors: strong leadership and firm handling of the transition to a free market economy, integration into the world economy, the growth in oil and gas production and increasing oil revenues due to rising prices. The main objective of Russia's efforts is to raise the standard of living of its citizens and bring the country's position at par with other major powers.
An analysis of Russia's economic performance during the past few years shows satisfactory results and steady growth. There was also an effective rate of rouble appreciation by an estimated 2.1 per cent in January 2006 compared to previous years. Its gross domestic product (GDP) registered a 6.4 per cent growth last year and has averaged 7 per cent over the past five years. The gold and hard currency reserves also indicate satisfactory increases. Russia in fact has started paying off its foreign debts much ahead of schedule. Its overall economic condition in 2005 was also characterised by a lower inflation rate.
Nevertheless, one major problem the country is facing today is a decline in the demographic profile. According to the State Statistics Committee, within the next 10 years Russia's population would decline to around 130 million from 143 million at present. In addition, the Russian population is also ageing. Low birth rate in the last few decades is mainly responsible for this situation. As a result, the average age is increasing and the working age population is structurally declining. Russia is now facing the challenge of reversing unfavourable demographic trends so as to sustain its growth.
Another serious hurdle that has emerged in recent years is the huge outflow of local population from Russia's Far East and Eastern Siberia. In this context, there is a need to redistribute the country's population and take-up other related measures like giving relaxation in tax, tariff, customs and the provision of facilities for ensuring continued flow of investment into the region and thus prevent outward migration. The severe demographic imbalance that exists in Russia's Far Eastern region bordering China could disrupt not only the socio-economic growth in the region but could also pose a severe security threat for Russia in the near future.
Another major hurdle is the high level of corruption. Observers feel that corruption is increasing so fast in Russia that bribe rates have grown even faster than oil prices! Any form of corruption can cause harm to the growth of a country. Hence, drastic measures are needed to control the growing corruption in Russia. Likewise, unlawful activities, prevalent in certain sectors, need to be strictly curbed to ensure smooth progress.
The resurgence of the Russian economy has ramifications for India. Indian business houses have started realising that Russia is the market for future investment, with tremendous opportunities and potential. Indian business analysts have calculated that Russia now has a huge capacity for growth in the field of financial services as well as in consumer durables. Mahindra & Mahindra has already planned to set up its first overseas factory in Russia by the end of this year to manufacture Sports Utility Vehicles and expand its sale throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Further, it has also planned to form a joint venture with a local Russian partner to set up units that will assemble kits sent from its Indian factory. European and Chinese automobile companies are also investing heavily in Russia. Other than automobiles and pharmaceutical companies, Indian IT (Information Technology) companies are also investing heavily in Russia and formulating partnerships to expand their business further to Europe jointly.
However, despite the heavy boom in the Russian market, Indian investors and business groups are sceptical about the longevity of this consumer explosion in Russia. Since the expropriation of Yukos, the Russian State has concentrated on taking over the energy sector and pushing the oligarchs out of this sphere. This strategy was further confirmed by the purchase of Sibneft by Gazprom, and the transformation of Gazprom into an international company backed by the state. This strategy of the Russian government, as well as the Yukos case, has generated scepticism among Indian business houses that the Kremlin might think of expropriating other private sector firms in the future. There is also a fear that since Russian economic resurgence is closely connected to global oil prices, a sudden downfall in oil prices might lead to a crash in the Russian market, thus causing heavy losses to the Indian investors - something that happened fifteen years back due to the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union.
Nonetheless, over the last few years, the Russian economy is in the resurgent mode. Domestic demand and the investment climate seem to have shown positive signs and foreign direct investment in Russia has also increased reasonably. Of late, Moscow has also approved a legal amendment for lifting currency restrictions, paving the way for making the Rouble a fully convertible currency from July 1, 2006. To make the process easier, it has gradually eased restrictions on capital flow as well as currency export operations. However, till January 1, 2007 the Central Bank would have the right to impose certain restrictions on capital transactions. This new development would make the investment climate in the country much healthier in coming years.
Some economic forecasts even suggest that given the way Russia is heading now and regaining its influence and economic power, it is bound to emerge soon as a global power. There is also a prediction that by 2025 Russia could become the world's eighth-largest economy with a per capita income of US$ 45,000. The unemployment rate in Russia has also declined from 8.1 to 7.1 per cent over the last few years and there has been a substantial reduction in poverty rates. The fiscal surplus is quite high and a stabilization fund has been established to buffer government revenues from variations in oil prices. Interest rates remain quite low (around 10 per cent). There is an improvement for small business sectors and the continuous expansion of entrepreneurship contributed for the continuous development of the middle class, which seems to be emerging fast. Interestingly, attitudes towards entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship in Russia are also changing significantly in a positive direction. All these indicate that the prospects are indeed bright for Russian's economic growth. And more importantly, they point towards a resurgent Russia.
After months of excruciating negotiations, testimonies and debates, the two crucial committees of the US Congress voted overwhelmingly in favour of the Indo-US nuclear agreement, setting the stage for a formal Congressional vote. The International Relations Committee of the House of Representatives approved a legislation favouring the agreement with a near three-fourths majority (37 to 5) on June 27. This was followed by a bigger mandate (16 to 2) in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 29, thus ensuring a definite "yes" vote at the joint session of the Congress. Though some deal-breaking amendments came up before both committees, they were rejected by huge margins in a demonstration of bipartisan support for nuclear co-operation and stronger ties with India. The bill titled "US and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act, 2006" (H.R. 5682) presented in the House Committee was a modified version of H.R. 4974 presented last year by House Committee Chairman Henry Hyde, and has significant amendments on the role of Congress in the process. While the earlier version had reduced the role of Congress to a bare minimum and gave the administration leeway to waive laws regarding nuclear commerce, the new bill restores its traditional role in such agreements. Besides mandating an approval by both houses through an un-amendable Joint Resolution, the new bill also adds some reporting requirements and consultative measures.
In this regard, a Sense of Congress has been added that lays out conditions for civil nuclear co-operation. Reiterating that prevention of nuclear proliferation is the primary objective of US policy, the House committee showered praises on the NPT by terming it as a significant success and affirming that countries outside the Treaty pose challenges to its overall goals. Therefore, one way of ensuring 'responsible behaviour' from non-NPT states with nuclear capabilities, the committee reasoned, is for the US to enter into an agreement with a non-NPT member if: a) The country has demonstrated responsible behaviour with respect to non-proliferation; b) The country has a democratic system, a congruent foreign policy, and co-operates with the US in its key non-proliferation initiatives through greater political and material support; and c) Such co-operation induces the country to implement the highest protection against proliferation and refrains from further development of nuclear weapons.
Assuming that New Delhi meets these conditions, the committee felt that the US could deepen its ties with India in many areas, including peaceful nuclear co-operation. Though an India-specific bill, the committee justified it by enunciating a set of parameters that would implicitly determine the framework for similar co-operation with other countries concurrent with their 'responsible behaviour'. Thus, one cannot discount a future US quid pro quo with a non-NPT or threshold state using this framework, especially when a need arises to legitimise the nuclear programmes of allies like Israel or Pakistan.
In addition, there is a Statement of Policy that clarifies the US perspective on issues pertaining to NPT and NSG, among others. Contending that the US should oppose any new nuclear weapon state from within or outside the NPT, the committee has sent a clear message that co-operation on nuclear energy as enshrined in Article IV of the Treaty should be interpreted as applicable only for those who are in full compliance with its obligations. Included in its stated goals for South Asia are efforts to achieve a moratorium on weapon grade fissile material production by India, Pakistan and China, along with conclusion of the FMCT. The committee also expects India to fully participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative and commit to its Statement of Interdiction Principles. In the same breath comes the non-binding, but most desirable, Indian commitment to "dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction Iran for its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capability." Interestingly, while prodding New Delhi on this, the committee has ignored India's demonstrated stand against Iran's non-compliance with IAEA obligations.
Regarding the waivers to existing law, the nature of Presidential Certifications have been tightened and broadened so as to ensure that India accomplishes obligations that have been agreed upon. The President is thereby assigned authority of waiver if India fulfils its commitments in areas such as the separation plan, safeguard agreements and additional protocol with IAEA, conclusion of FMCT, co-operation on US non-proliferation activities, adherence to NSG, MTCR, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement. In addition, he will have to make annual certifications on India's compliance with various provisions of the agreement. Over half-a-dozen amendments came up in the House Committee related to India's accession to the NPT, its nuclear weapons, the India-specific NSG legislation and so on. While votes against such amendments stood at around 32 throughout, even those members who had pushed negative amendments eventually voted for the bill, as they did not want to be seen as acting against India.
It was more of a cakewalk in the Senate Committee where two out of three amendments were accepted. While the committee approved Senator Obama's amendment for discontinuance of nuclear fuel supply to India if the deal is terminated, their reluctance to vote on India's nuclear weapons led to rejection of an amendment seeking a Presidential Certification that the US would not aid India's nuclear weapons programme. The Senate members then joined their House counterparts in mandating that the deal, once negotiated, should be approved by Congress before it enters into force.
The successful vote at the two committees, and a forthcoming final Congressional vote, would pave the way for exemptions from Sections 123, 128 and 129 of the US Atomic Energy Act 1954. This would lead to the creation of a new nuclear energy regime whereby US companies could apply for licenses to export nuclear reprocessing equipment and technology to India. Though there is general satisfaction in India on the legislation, criticisms have been made on some 'intrusive' references in the Sense of Congress, which are in fact non-binding clauses usually insisted upon during all such legislations. Still, some experts feel that New Delhi has conceded much, especially in foreign policy commitments, in return for a mere nuclear co-operation agreement. Revered nuclear scientist Homi Sethna, for instance, went to the extent of remarking that joining the NPT would have been a better option for India!
The eventual passage of the bill would be a major success for the Bush administration, especially for ensuring that the concerted campaign against the deal from many quarters did not find much echo in the Congress. All eyes are now on the negotiation process of the 123 Agreement, which is being fine-tuned in accordance with the committees' requirements so as to ensure a 'yes' vote in August before the Congress goes on recess. Both sides can now confidently wait for the day when a resolution at a joint session of the Congress would read: The Congress hereby approves the Agreement for Nuclear Co-operation between the United States of America and the Republic of India submitted by the President, titled "Joint Resolution Approving an Agreement for Nuclear Co-operation Between the United States and India.''
Israel has stepped up its military offensive against Palestine. Codenamed Operation Summer Rain, it began on June 28 in response to the kidnapping of Corporal Gilad Shalit of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). Palestinian militant groups kidnapped Shalit on June 25 when they raided a military post near Kibbutz Kerem Shalom in Israeli territory just outside the Gaza Strip. The militants had infiltrated into Israel through a 300-metre tunnel dug under the Gaza border fence near the military post. Two Israeli soldiers, Lt. Hanan Barak and Sgt. Pavel slu*tsker were killed in the attack. Hamas' military wing, known as Izzedine al-Qassam Brigade, and two other groups connected to Hamas - the Popular Resistance Committee and the Army of Islam - have claimed responsibility for the kidnapping. Corporal Shalit is the first Israeli soldier to be captured by Palestinians since 1994.
Palestinian officials have, however, denied any knowledge of the kidnapping. President Mahmoud Abbas has stated that the raid was orchestrated by Hamas' Khaled Mashaal, who lives in exile in Syria, without consulting the Hamas-led Government in Palestine. But this claim was refuted by a Hamas official in Beirut, who accused Fatah of implicating Mashaal in order to provide Israel with a pretext to target him.
The Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has, however, blamed the Palestinian Authority headed by President Abbas and the Hamas-led Palestinian government as "responsible" for the incident and the consequences that were likely to follow. He termed the kidnapping as part of a "murderous, hateful, fanatical Islamic extremist desire to destroy the state of Israel." Israeli Army's Chief of Staff Dan Halutz also squarely blamed Hamas for the kidnapping.
The timing of the raid by the Palestinian militant groups was indeed significant. It occurred on the day when Fatah and Hamas were to release a document, which implicitly recognized Israel's right to exist and was aimed at easing Western sanctions on the Hamas government. The document also outlined a common political platform, with the Hamas government authorising Mahmoud Abbas to conduct negotiations with Israel. The document must have irked hardliners within Hamas. The raid forestalled the release of the document. Perhaps the attack and kidnapping was also indicative of growing divisions within Hamas' more moderate faction ruling in Gaza and its hard-line factions spread across the region. Though Hamas has vehemently denied suggestions of a growing internal split, it has not been able to come up with a convincing response as to why it was clueless about the June 25 raid on the Israeli military post carried out by groups affiliated to it.
The militant groups have demanded the release of some 8,500 Palestinians held in Israeli prisons in return for Shalit's release. Ruling out any negotiations or bargaining with the kidnappers for the release of Corporal Shalit, Israel launched Operation Summer after the Israeli air force struck at the power plant and bridges in Gaza strip. The strike at Gaza's only power plant plunged most of it into darkness. At a press conference in Gaza on July 7, President Abbas expressed anguish that Israel, by destroying schools, a power plant, bridges, roads, and government building was "not only trying to collapse the Hamas government but bring down the Palestinian authority wholesale."
Concerned about the ongoing developments in Gaza, the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting on June 30. Ambassador Riyad Mansour, Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations, described the Israeli actions as "flagrant military aggression." In a sharp and stinging address to the Security Council, he accused Israel of planning the military offensive much before the June 25 kidnapping of the Israeli soldier and went on to state that Israel had issued a series of threats and declarations of its intention to carry out pre-emptive strikes against the Gaza Strip. He urged the Security Council to condemn the Israeli action and pressurize it to end hostilities immediately. For his part, the Deputy Israeli Ambassador to the UN Daniel Carmon asserted that Israel has increasingly come to realise that its pull out from Gaza last year was a mistake. He stated that Gaza was turning into a base for terrorist groups supported by the elected Hamas government. The US Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton echoed the Israeli Deputy Ambassador's views on the situation. He also drew a linkage between the recent surge of violence in Gaza Strip and the role of Iran and Syria in sponsoring terrorism in the region.
The situation on the ground at present is volatile. Said Sayyam, Interior Minister for Hamas, has ordered all Palestinian security forces to fight the Israelis in Gaza. President Abbas has, however, termed the order "invalid". In the meantime, though limiting itself to air strikes and surgical ground offensives in the beginning, Israel has gradually upped the ante. Prime Minister Olmert and other senior Israeli security officers have agreed on a broad-based military campaign to get the kidnapped soldier released and prevent ongoing Palestinian rockets from targeting the Israeli city of Ashkelon. On July 5, Israeli tanks and troops entered northern Gaza and exchanged fire with Palestinian gunmen. Violence has also spread to Nablus in the occupied West Bank. Fearing a speedy acceleration in the levels of violence, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan issued a statement on July 8 calling for an immediate halt to the "disproportionate" use of force by Israel, which has already resulted in a number of Palestinian deaths, as well as the cessation of rocket fire into Israel by Palestinian militants.
Israel has, however, shown no signs of stopping its military operation. The Israeli Security Cabinet has issued a statement on the urgent need to change the rules of engagement with the Hamas-led government. It also indicates that Israel must continue targeting Hamas institutions and cordon off the Strip to limit terrorist movements. The current Israeli policy is clearly indicative of the path that would be trodden in the coming months: a trajectory of increasing violence and escalating civilian casualties. Israel's latest military actions in the Gaza have led to the death of 26 Palestinian civilians and the wounding of 80 others. Meanwhile, Arab nations have expressed fear that Israel's counter-offensive in Palestine could turn the region into a cauldron of unrest. The Israeli action could also have negative fallout on the ongoing fragile security situation in neighbouring Iraq.
The post 9/11 international situation has witnessed aggressive uses of force to combat terrorism across international borders. The logic is that since terrorists respect no borders neither can states that are fighting the menace. However, Israel's military action in Gaza is clearly disproportionate with regard to both the means used (read military intervention) and the end sought. For seeking the release of one kidnapped soldier, no state can justify military intervention on the scale that Israel has undertaken, which threatens the entire population of Gaza.
At this juncture, it is important that negotiations, short of prolonged military action, should take centre-stage. President Abbas has also expressed the hope that Egyptian-led negotiations would succeed in mitigating the crisis. In this light, the statement of Avi Ditcher, government minister in charge of Internal Security and former head of Shin Bet should be taken serious note of. He said that Israel is open to the release of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Shilat's release and the re-establishment of a credible cease-fire. Such a posture could enable a negotiated settlement to the present crisis in Gaza.
July 7 marks the first anniversary of the 2005 terrorist attacks on London. These attacks and the thwarted ones on July 21 not only claimed the lives of more than fifty people of different nationalities, but once again brought to the fore a serious threat to global security, i.e., suicide bombing. The four suicide bombers, drawn from the Muslim community in Britain with South Asian and Caribbean origins, have left a permanent scar on the collective British psyche. The July 7 attacks were the monstrous manifestation of a grave indigenous threat of Islamic radicalism arising from amongst a part of the second and third generation Muslim immigrants settled in Europe. As the British nation and the entire world condole the lives lost on July 7, it is imperative to retrospect on the incident. In addition, it also needs to be observed what kind of counter-terrorism measures are under discussion and likely to be taken or have been facing resistance. As counter-terrorism measures include larger issues involving a wider cross-section of the society, e.g., media, minorities, inter-community relations, foreign policy, unemployment etc., a brief overview of the British scene also needs to be taken into account.
Tony Blair's press conference on August 5, 2005 was significant in that he announced that the rules of game would change. What he actually meant was that the decade-old practice of the radical Islamic groups, known extremists, and individual hate preachers using Britain for their uncontrolled activities would be curbed. At that time it was anticipated that two known radical Islamic organisations, Hijb-ut Tahrir and Al Muhajiroun would soon be proscribed. In fact, Al Muhajiroun, fearing a government prohibition, had voluntarily changed its name as early as 2004 and assumed different identities. The popular mood just after the terrorist attacks was rightly against these organisations and individuals, which forced one infamous Jihad preacher, Mohammad Omar Bakri, to flee the UK. Considering the grave threat posed by these organisations and preachers in terms of their role in radicalising the British Muslim youth, serious deliberations have started to extradite, deport or send back these 'unacceptable' people to their countries of origin. However, given that deportation or extradition of some known radical Islamists to their countries of origin would result in them facing harsh punishments or even torture in contravention of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the British government decided to sign Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with about ten countries including Jordan and Syria. In order to find out the root causes of radicalism and the acceptability of extremist ideology amongst the Muslim youth in Britain, the British Home Office formed an experts' panel to come up with recommendations.
However, seen in retrospect, all these measures during the last year have faced either resistance or met with some unanticipated outcomes. The mistaken killing of the Brazilian engineer Jean Charles de Menezes in a London Metro on July 22 in tune with the shoot-to-kill policy of the local police was a matter of serious concern. Same was the experience of an anti-terrorist operation conducted in June 2006 at the Forest Gate area of London when a resident of Pakistani origin was wrongly shot at. This latter incident also led to tension and mistrust within the Muslim community residing in the area who accused the British police of racial and religious bias. On the other hand, Hizb ut- Tahrir, as proposed by Blair, cannot be proscribed because of protests from human rights organisations. Al Muhajiroun is presently working under different names like Al Ghurabaa' (The Strangers), the Saved Sect, etc.
As far as events outside the UK are concerned, the stationing of British soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan and casualties incurred in these places have remained an issue of public debate. Events like the irresponsible publication of cartoons by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten depicting the Prophet as a suicide bomber have not only fomented unprecedented reactions around the world but also underlined an oft-repeated complaint against the European media of being biased against Islam and the Muslims. Though the European Muslim community in general and the British Muslim community in particular has shown ideal restraint during the cartoon controversy, this kind of provocative publication does not serve any productive purpose for continued inter-faith and inter-community dialogue in Europe. Charges of renditions of terrorist suspects in clandestine detention centres by the American CIA across Europe have been not only a matter of transatlantic debate but also among human rights organisations, the Council of Europe and European national governments.
Significantly, the British government published two reports in May 2006. One report, prepared by the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC - an all-party parliamentary committee), deals with British security thinking, counter-terrorism policy and a comprehensive awareness of the threat of radicalisation and its application to strategic thinking. Another was the British Government's detailed official account of the terrorist attacks on July 7 and the social background of the suicide bombers. Furthermore, the British government has also come out with a kind of an Action Taken Report in response to the ISC document. These two reports have been definitely illuminating and enable readers to furnish themselves with interesting facts about the suicide bombers, their previous lives, achievements in British society and their sudden radicalisation and adoption of terrorist means. Both reports have some similarities in terms of their exhaustive elaboration of the different levels of security alerts, their justification, and resources available for intelligence agencies to address some specific cases. But they have not attempted to address larger political issues like British foreign policy and seemed to have confined themselves to issues within British frontiers. For instance, the official account does not embark upon the issue of the War on Iraq in any way. In the whole document Iraq is mentioned only four times and that too only to compile the chronology of global terrorist activities.
As the world commemorates the first anniversary of the terrorist attacks in London, the immediate terrorist threat for Britain has not decreased. Undoubtedly, the threat is indigenous, and has not only European and transatlantic but global ramifications as well. The existence of terrorist sleeper cells on British soil, their planning and potential to attack targets (domestic and elsewhere) and the long-term strategy of terrorist organisations to infiltrate the British intelligence set-up are not imaginary or hyped but real. However, the security conundrum in a liberal democracy like Britain is expected to continue as the experience of the last one year demonstrates.
A substantial improvement in this regard needs to be mentioned here - the European Commission has recently proposed that in order to increase judicial co-operation amongst EU members, in future decisions pertaining to Justice and Home Affairs issues would be taken up on the basis of qualified majority voting and not on the basis of unanimity amongst members. The present Finnish EU presidency is expected to deal with the proposal. Given increasing cooperation among European agencies especially after the Madrid and London terrorist attacks, the solution to the terrorist menace lies partially in closer global co-operation amongst the affected nations. Strategic issues like checking the trend of radicalisation amongst a part of Muslim youth in Europe would have different European versions and need to be primarily dealt with at the national level while at the same time drawing upon lessons from other nations as well.
On July 1, 2006 China inaugurated the world's highest railway - a 710-mile (1,956 kms) line connecting Golmud with Lhasa. It traverses 550 kms of unstable permafrost, reaching the heights of 16,400 feet above sea level, and completes the journey in forty-eight hours. The inauguration coincided with two other big anniversaries: the 85th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party and the 10th anniversary of Hong Kong's handover from British rule. The completion of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway (QTR) project is central to China's Great Western Development Policy, which aims at greater economic development of the country's under-developed Western areas populated by ethnic minorities. This policy is also commensurate with greater 'Hanization' of China's West. In fact, the railway line is not only aimed at taming this region but also at promoting the cause of Chinese nationalism and great power status.
The idea of a railway line from China into Tibet was first proposed by Sun Yatsen in the nineteenth century and it was later revived under Communist rule in the 1950s. Construction of the first section of the railway line (814 kms), the Xining-Golmud section, started in 1958. After grinding to a halt during the Cultural Revolution, work on it was resumed only in the reform era in 1979. It was finally opened to traffic in 1984. The latter section of this project, the Golmud-Lhasa line, was mooted in 2001 under the 10th Five-Year Plan, which allocated 26.2 billion yuan for its construction. Though the target date for completion was initially set for 2007, the project has been completed much ahead of schedule.
Reports suggest that the QTR will facilitate an increase in the movement of products up to forty five times its current level and cut down transport costs for goods by seventy five per cent. Further, two freight trains would run daily from Xining (capital of Qinghai Province) to Lhasa, facilitating the movement of grain crops, construction materials as well as production and living necessities into Tibet, while handicrafts and agricultural products would move the other way. With faster transportation, the QTR will also help to establish mining and manufacturing industries in the remote areas of Qinghai and Tibet. China Daily reports that the greatest impact would, however, be felt in the tourism sector with revenues expected to double by 2010 in Tibet. An unconfirmed Chinese report suggests that Beijing has also undertaken the building of three more railway lines in Tibet in the next ten years as extensions of the QTR, which would link Lhasa with Nyingchi in the east and Xigaze in the west, while the third would link Xigaze with Yadong - a major trading town on the India-China border. All these are likely to further increase mobility and facilitate economic growth in land-locked Tibet.
A closer look into China's Great Western Development Policy suggests that the infrastructure development in Tibet, including the QTR, forms the linchpin of China's nationalism project. It underscores the core of Deng Xiaoping's minority policy, which emphasized on economic development to solve the nationality question. Also, according to Deng, since Tibet is a big area with a small population, its development by Tibetans alone would not be possible. The Han Chinese, therefore, should help in its economic development. Accordingly, Deng justified the influx of Han Chinese into Tibet as a necessary step to promote economic development. Economic prosperity, it was believed, would quell the minority's resistance to Han Chinese and prevent them from secessionism.
Following Deng Xiaoping, Hu Jintao also advocated a policy of generating economic prosperity to eradicate separatism. Hailing the infrastructural development in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as a national security strategy, Hu said, "Rapid economic development is the fundamental condition for realising the interests of all ethnic groups in Tibet and also the basic guarantee for greater ethnic unity and continued stability there." The QTR, is thus, envisaged as a means to assimilate the Tibetan minority population into the Chinese mainstream and fulfil the goal of Chinese nationalism.
Moreover, the QTR has facilitated Beijing's projection of its great power status. As Hu Jintao noted, "The project is not only a magnificent feat in China's history of railway construction, but also a great miracle of the world's railway history." By undertaking such an engineering marvel, Beijing seeks to portray itself as a great power that could overcome "three major difficulties to rewrite the world's history of railway construction." The three difficulties have been identified as frozen tundra, high altitude and environmental hazards.
It may be argued that the construction of the QTR is primarily predicated on developing strategic and defence structures in the TAR. The rationale for building roads and railways in the TAR is essentially "military and strategic-oriented," while economic benefits emanating from them are mainly "side effects". In fact, most of the money invested in Tibet so far has gone into the development of strategic roads and railways. By late 1996 China had built 15 trunk highways and 375 feeder roads with a total length of 22,000 kms. The purpose was to establish strategic links through highways connecting central Tibet and China, and extending the links to Xigaze and Gangze - two important places in central western Tibet. Further, highways were established to link the Tibetan-Himalayan borders. The strategic salience of the QTR is also evident in China's counter-terrorism measures in the TAR. There are more than 40,000 troops in the TAR, though the Tibetan exile government puts the figure at 250,000. They are employed to stamp out any kind of Tibetan resistance. The QTR can thus be said to form a part of China's defence and strategic policy, and many Tibetans fear that it will bring no direct positive benefits for them.
Furthermore, there are apprehensions that the QTR would speed up Han migration into the TAR and marginalise the local Tibetans. New economic opportunities have already attracted migrant workers from China's large mobile population to Tibetan areas with the result that there was a net increase in the non-Tibetan share of the TAR population from approximately 4 per cent in 1990 to 6 per cent in 2000. This trend is likely to intensify with the opening of the new railway line. Lhasa is now largely a Chinese city swarming with Han Chinese and dotted with Chinese style buildings. In addition, the tourism industry in the TAR is tightly controlled by the Han Chinese, is heavily concentrated in the Han-dominated urban areas, and remains out of reach of the rural Tibetans. Further, the Qinghai-Tibet railway involves state-owned construction companies from outside Tibet. The ownership of the railroad is also likely to remain with the national government, which is the main investor. Devoid of local ownership and dependent on central subsidies, the fruits of the QTR are thus not likely to reach the eighty-five per cent rural population of Tibet. It is also feared that the railway line may cause severe environmental problems and ecological imbalances. Given all the above, it is no wonder that the Dalai Lama sees the opening of the Qinghai-Tibet railway line as a Chinese plot to 'liberate' Tibet a second time.
In fact, China's Western Development Policy has a lot to do with Tibet's strategic location, which is also a factor in Sino-Indian relations. China aims to achieve a strategic capability vis-à-vis India through this railway project. In military terms, the rail link gives Beijing the capability to mobilize up to 12 divisions in a month. Though China does not pose a direct military threat to India today, its strategic infrastructure in Tibet will enhance its military capability and would potentially enable it to coerce India on the border dispute.
Over the last three years, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have witnessed significant geopolitical shifts in the region - the resurgence of Russia, China's increasing influence, a colour revolution in Kyrgyzstan, unrest and shift in Uzbekistan's foreign policy, and the growing prominence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Since 2004, the SCO's influence and role has been growing in the Central Asian region and the last two summits of the SCO are significant in terms of making the international community take notice of this regional grouping. The Astana summit in 2005 was important for its declaration asking the United States to provide a time frame for the withdrawal of its military forces from SCO territories. The Summit in Shanghai on June 15, 2006, took place against the backdrop of the crisis over Iran's nuclear programme and Iran and Pakistan both seeking full membership in the organisation. The next meeting under the Kyrgyz presidency will be held in Bishkek in 2007.
During the summit, ten documents were signed on a broad range of issues. Important among these are - declaration on the SCO's fifth anniversary, a joint communiqué on closer SCO cooperation, a statement on international information security, a resolution on fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism from 2007 to 2009, an agreement on joint anti-terrorism actions among member countries, an agreement on cutting off infiltration channels of terrorism, separatists and extremists, a resolution of the SCO Business Council, and an action plan of the SCO Interbank Association on supporting regional cooperation. An important aspect of this summit was the Russian proposal for creating an energy club within the SCO. On the sidelines of this summit, business contracts and loan agreements worth some US$ 2 billion were inked. These deals involve a highway project connecting Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, two high-voltage electricity lines in Tajikistan, a cement plant in Kyrgyzstan, and a hydropower station in Kazakhstan.
The other important issue was of full membership for Iran and Pakistan. While Iran was keen to get full membership, President Pervez Musharraf lobbied hard for Islamabad's membership. But China and Russia withheld support for Iran's full membership and the CAR's, in particular Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, were also opposed to it. Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban was seen as a major obstacle in granting it permanent membership.
Iran's participation at the summit was seen by the West as creating a security grouping to oppose the collective forces of the US and NATO. Iranian President Ahmadinejad said that the SCO could "ward off the threats of domineering powers to use their force against and interfere in the affairs of other states." The SCO declaration clearly stated that "diversity of civilization and model of development must be respected and upheld. Differences in culture traditions, political and social systems, values and model of development formed in the course of history should not be taken as pretexts to interfere in other countries' internal affairs. Model of social development should not be 'exported'…" These signals have caused trepidation in Washington.
However, it would be difficult, given the nature of the complexities in Central Asia, for the SCO to become an "OPEC with nukes" or "Asian Warsaw Pact". China and its official media have denied any possibility of the SCO becoming a rival to the US and NATO. At the same time it is unlikely that China and Russia would allow the US to intervene and interfere in their backyard. The relevance and viability of the SCO as a multilateral body would depend on how it evolves in the next ten years.
So far the results for the SCO have been somewhat mixed. The very fact that the SCO has been able to sustain and survive is in itself an achievement. It has managed to settle the border issues among the member states. Though, most delicate issues were resolved bilaterally rather than multilaterally. Central Asian states have been expecting more productive participation by the SCO in providing solutions.
One can enumerate various reasons for the lack of conclusive results. The major shortcomings for the SCO have been mainly the absence of political will and confidence; difference in economic status of member states; competition with other organisations, lack of resources for development, cultural differences and domestic challenges of CAR's. In addition, opposition from the countries that are left out has been a major source of weakness. Finally, lack of clear direction for cooperative endeavours has prevented it from moving forward. However, it can be argued that it is too early to expect conclusive results from the SCO as it would need a time frame to mature and is still in the process of defining its political characteristics and functions.
For China, the SCO provides a perfect political and economic mechanism to contain the Uighur separatist movement, access to Central Asian energy resources and economic benefits. The SCO provides China an opportunity to regain its strategic space which had started waning post 9/11 with increasing US influence. For Russia, the SCO provides an opportunity for strengthening its political, military and economic ties with CARs and for engaging China economically while at the same time balancing US influence. Recent developments indicate that for the time being cooperation between Moscow and Beijing within the SCO and further improvement in their ties may serve as a counterbalance to Washington's Central Asia policy.
For Central Asians, the SCO provides greater manoeuvring capacity to balance the major powers and gain economic and military aid. CAR's are looking to reduce their vulnerability to external powers. Their responses to this new unfolding situation is driven more by their need for economic support and investments in various sectors, and fear of increasing political opposition, than by the fear of great power rivalry and hegemony. Central Asia's desire to cooperate with the SCO is driven not only because the current regimes wish to stay in power but also by the fact and realization on their part of the rise of China. Therefore, the SCO essentially provides a delicate equilibrium among the members in the post-cold war geopolitical paradigm.
India has never featured in this equilibrium, even though Central Asians have always perceived India's potential to be a countervailing factor in this region. For India, containing the unstable situation in and around Afghanistan-Pakistan, ensuring its energy security and stability in CARs, all remain critical and paramount components of its policy towards Central Asia.
India joined the SCO as an observer at the Astana summit. Given its past links with this region, its secular framework, growing economy and strong IT sector, India has much to contribute to the economic development of the CAR's. Though observer status cannot be seen as a step towards full membership, it provides India an opportunity to watch the developments within the SCO. The SCO can provide India a framework wherein it can engage China and Pakistan to improve its connectivity with CARs, address the problem of terrorism, enhance its trade with CAR's and tap its vast energy resources. It would not be in India's interest to be part of the organization if the SCO turns into some kind of military alliance.
India sees no confrontation with China and looks for further cooperation with that country. The future strategic configuration of Central Asia will depend on how regional powers address the challenges and opportunities for cooperation arising from within Central Asia. But the Chinese, Russian and American national interests in Central Asia and Afghanistan will continue to determine the future course of security and stability in the region. India is an important, but not a key, player in Central Asia. Therefore India's primary focus in Central Asia should be damage control; preventing existing problems from escalating into crises to the scale of Afghanistan and working towards economic diplomacy. In this new security paradigm, India's interests require a cooperative relationship with SCO member states.
The future of SCO would depend firstly on how it addresses the conflicting interests of member states and other regional and extra regional players in the region. Secondly, how cooperation and mutually advantageous equality would serve as the basis of the relations among member states and states with observer status. Thirdly, the question of expanding the organization would determine the scope and role of the SCO. Fourthly, the SCO's success in economic co-operation would be conditioned by the fear of smaller SCO members, in that smaller states might fear that their resources would become vulnerable to exploitation by larger members. The geographical configuration and political composition of the SCO reveal the asymmetry among member states. It consists of two major powers and four small states of Central Asia. If the SCO has to emerge as a successful regional organisation, it should develop into an effective multilateral organisation to address security and economic challenges in the region on the basis of mutually beneficial terms among its members.
